Abstract
Abstract
In order to count as genuinely transcendental, a philosophical theory must seek to uncover necessary, universal structures that shape our perspective on the world. Chapters 3 and 6 provide evidence that Merleau-Ponty did engage in this style of analysis in Structure and Phenomenology. But there are aspects of his views that work against this interpretation as well. He explicitly blurs the distinction between the empirical and transcendental, questions the search for conditions of possibility, and places limits on reflection. This chapter will clarify Merleau-Ponty’s conception of reflection in Phenomenology, and show how it ties into a genuine form of transcendental analysis. These considerations will also lead to a discussion of Merleau-Ponty’s melding of empirical and transcendental argumentation and elucidate his thoughts on the validity of the natural sciences.
Publisher
Oxford University PressOxford
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