Abstract
Abstract
This chapter opens with a general overview of Phenomenology’s arguments, and the transcendental idealist interpretation is situated in relation to this overview. In general, Phenomenology uses an analysis of psychological and phenomenological results, paired with a critique of intellectualism and empiricism, to reveal the pre-objective element of our experience. This chapter argues that the pre-objectivity has to be understood as related to our embodied subjective perspectives and its analysis reveals the transcendental structures of that perspective. As with the discussion of Structure in Chapter 3, certain problems that arise in Phenomenology are temporarily set to the side so that the full transcendental idealist interpretation can be first elaborated here.
Publisher
Oxford University PressOxford
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