Abstract
Abstract
Chapter 6 set to the side some problems that arise for the transcendental interpretation of Phenomenology. This chapter considers those problems insofar as they are related to consciousness and subjectivity. Merleau-Ponty’s emphasis on the connection between body and world suggests the possibility that our experience is shaped by elements outside the scope of subjectivity. Specifically, his notion of an “anonymous” element of our experience poses difficulties for the transcendental idealist conception of the mind. Despite these problems, this chapter argues that Merleau-Ponty’s view is ultimately compatible with the transcendental interpretation. This leads to a consideration of the “tacit cogito” and temporality, and deepens the book’s consideration of Merleau-Ponty’s conception of the embodied mind.
Publisher
Oxford University PressOxford
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