Case Study: Hyperintensionalism

Abstract

Abstract This chapter applies the approach developed in the first two chapters to the current trend for hyperintensional frameworks in metaphysics, on which necessary equivalents can differ in reference. It argues that such frameworks exhibit strong evidence of overfitting. This is shown in detail for impossible worlds semantics, truthmaker semantics, and the theory of structured Russellian propositions, all of which are far more complicated than standard intensional alternatives. Hyperintensionalism is primarily motivated by alleged counterexamples to intensionalism; such a ‘data-driven’ approach is vulnerable to overfitting. In particular, key judgments on flagship examples for hyperintensionalism are shown to be explicable as outputs of a heuristic for assessing ‘because’ statements (constitutive as well as causal) in terms of how well they do as answers to ‘Why?’ questions. This heuristic generates demonstrably incorrect verdicts on some closely related cases because it projects merely presentational differences between answers to apparent differences in the non-representational world.