COERCION AND THE NATURE OF LAW argues that it is a conceptually necessary condition for something to count as a system of law according to our conceptual practices that it authorizes the imposition of coercive sanctions for violations of some mandatory norms governing non-official behavior (the Coercion Thesis). The book begins with an explication of the modest approach to conceptual analysis that is deployed throughout. The remainder of the book is concerned to show that an institutional normative system is not reasonably contrived to do anything that law must be able to do for us to make sense of why we adopt systems of law to regulate non-official behavior unless we assume that mandatory norms governing that behavior are backed by the threat of a sovereign; an institutional normative system that satisfies every other plausible existence condition for law is not reasonably contrived to give rise to either objective or subjective first-order motivating reasons to comply with mandatory norms governing non-official behavior unless they are backed by the threat of a coercive sanction. Law’s presumed conceptual normativity can be explained only by the Coercion Thesis.