Abstract
AbstractThis chapter summarizes the main conclusions of this book and how normative pluralism can be a fruitful theory with explanatory power. It also argues that normative pluralism is not necessarily a more revisionary theory than its rival normative monism and that monist positions can be highly revisionary. Lastly, a way forward for dealing with moral-prudential conflicts is examined. Instead of trying to resolve apparent moral-prudential conflicts through dealing with the supposed relative weights of moral and prudential reasons, we can instead look at the possibility of removing the conflict by the way in which moral and prudential requirements can both be fulfilled and integrated in a single life. This can involve practical, social, and political solutions, as well as philosophical examinations about how moral and prudential concerns are, in fact, intertwined.
Publisher
Oxford University PressNew York
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