The Argument from Nominal-Notable Comparisons

Abstract

AbstractThis chapter responds to the most common objection to normative pluralism. The idea that morality and prudence are incommensurable normative domains tends to be rejected because of “the argument from nominal-notable comparisons.” The argument relies on a premise that there are situations of moral-prudential conflict where we have a clear intuition that there are things we ought to do “all things considered.” It is usually concluded that this shows that morality and prudence must be comparable. The chapter argues that normative pluralists can account for these intuitions by (1) arguing that an “ought all things considered” need not presuppose intertype comparability among the reasons it covers and (2) endorsing more sophisticated theories of prudence, theories for which there are good, independent reasons to endorse, in any case. By following these steps, normative pluralism does not need to have the counterintuitive implications it is often thought to have.