The Codification Challenge

Abstract

AbstractCan we discover and codify the way in which moral and prudential reasons are to be compared? This chapter looks at (i) three original proposals for such codifications (those of Derek Parfit, Joshua Gert, and Dale Dorsey) and (ii) attempts to avoid the codification challenge though the position that our practical reasons are comparable but also uncodifiable. As Gert’s and Dorsey’s proposals have much in common and make concessions to normative pluralism, both are discussed under the label “weak monism.” While both Parfit’s “wide dualism” and weak monism can account for some of the intuitions supporting normative pluralism, it is argued that normative pluralism overall has advantages over these theories. It is furthermore argued that trying to avoid the codification challenge may be the monist’s best route, but it also faces several challenges. Neither particularism nor various forms of Aristotelianism can by themselves guarantee the comparability of moral and prudential reasons.