Is There a “Feminist” Philosophy of Language?

Abstract

Abstract Feminist uncovering of masculinist bias within philosophy has given rise to two types of feminist project: the “replacement” project, which aims to replace philosophical programs held to be irreparably biased with distinctively feminist programs, and the “practicalist” project, which aims to mine male-constructed philosophical theories for ideas useful to feminist work. I argue against pursuing replacement projects, on the grounds that they depend on a prior delegitimation of opposing views, and ad feminem dismissal of philosophers who hold them. Practicalist projects, on the other hand, acknowledge that even theories infected by masculinist bias can contain ideas that are not only cogent, but of practical value to feminists. I illustrate these claims with a case study: Jennifer Hornsby’s claim that individualistic theories of language ought to be rejected by feminists because they spring from masculinist bias. I happen to be a defender of the sort of theory Hornsby dismisses.