Ways to Be Concerned with Gender in Philosophy

Abstract

AbstractSome (non-exhaustive) ways in which philosophy can tackle gender are presented and examined: the critique of gender stereotypes through discourse analysis, the critique of gender essentialism, research on how gender concepts work, and reflection upon how gender issues relate to issues of intersubjective recognition. The first three ways, despite making important contributions to how gender is conceived of, do not seem to provide solid grounds for the rejection of gender discrimination, the refutation of essentialist beliefs about the genders, and the neutralization of the normative import of gender concepts. A fourth way is proposed, which considers gendered subjectivity in the context of the dynamics of intersubjective relations, framing it in a view of intersubjective recognition as a basic process in human life. In this perspective, gender issues constitute a context in which people’s capability and willingness to recognize others as subjects, and specifically as human persons, is tested.