Abstract
AbstractThis final substantive chapter explores the patterns and constitutional treatment of intergovernmental relations in the EU. This analysis concludes the second part of the book, which focuses on the shared rule component of foreign relations federalism. The chapter explains how intergovernmental relations are an important feature of foreign relations federalism in the EU, even despite the strong political safeguards discussed in Chapter 7. The chapter looks at two categories of intergovernmental relations in EU foreign relations: vertical and horizontal. Concerning the former, the chapter further examines how the EU Treaties manage the negotiation and conclusion of mixed agreements. In so doing, the chapter proposes to codify the obligations that flow from the duty of sincere cooperation in the form of an ‘EU Mixity Act’, and looks at the interplay between the principles of sincere cooperation and autonomy. Concerning the latter, the chapter looks at how the EU Treaties deal with (international) agreements between EU Member States, and puts forward a proposal for an ‘EU Compact Clause’ as a mechanism to prevent conflicts from arising between EU law and policy on the one hand, and Member State agreements on the other.
Publisher
Oxford University PressOxford
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