Abstract
AbstractThis chapter focuses on the question of whether incommensurable options are invariably comparable, even if simply as on a par, or whether some incommensurable options are strictly incomparable. After an assessment of the small-improvement argument and several variations on it, it is concluded that, whether or not options can be strictly incomparable, there is room for cases beyond not just classic cases of trichotomous comparability but even beyond cases involving options that, although not trichotomously comparable, are still comparable as both positive, or both negative, or, even if indeterminate, both fairly neutral. In the relevant further cases, at least one option that combines a positive feature and a negative feature is not positive, negative, neutral, or even fairly neutral (overall). To the extent that comparability is revealed as applicable in such cases, skepticism about incomparability can persist, but its significance is reduced by the revelation of how little comparability requires.
Publisher
Oxford University PressNew York
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