Sense as Mode of Representation

Abstract

Abstract Frege tells us that we need to distinguish sense from reference, but he does not say very much about what sense is. There are two main traditions for understanding the notion, both with their roots in the work of Sir Michael Dummett. On one, also developed by David Chalmers, sense is a condition an object must satisfy to be the object of a particular thought. On the other, best known from the work of Gareth Evans, sense is to be understood in terms of what makes something the object of a particular thought. This chapter develops and motivates the first of these traditions and then argues that it cannot be defended. It then discusses how the second tradition differs (largely because it abandons internalism) and argues that it can, at least potentially, allow for a substantial notion of sense. But such a view has to abandon one of Frege’s key claims about sense: that it is an aspect of representational content.