Blame’s Commitment to Its Own Fittingness

Abstract

AbstractWhen we blame, we respond to someone’s wrongdoing. Yet remarkably diverse ways of responding to wrongdoing might be counted as examples of blame. Public calling out, private seething, and even sadly deciding to stop relying on a friend can all arguably be instances of blame—but the first is an action, the second an emotional response, and the third a decision. Do such diverse forms of blame have anything significant enough in common to warrant theorizing about blame as such? This chapter argues that blame always involves an element of ‘reflexive endorsement’: a self-referential commitment to its own fittingness directly on the basis of someone’s wrongdoing. Reflexive endorsement accounts for blame’s directedness (at a person, for his wrong) and explains why blame can feel particularly self-righteous. This commitment also imputes unique fittingness conditions to blame, and thus provides reason to think of blame as meaningfully unified.