In Defence of the Right Kind of Reason

Abstract

AbstractFor a long time, the normativity literature took for granted that ‘right-kind reasons’ for attitudes are authoritatively normative reasons. However, in the last several years, this view has come under attack. One argument against the authoritative normativity of right-kind reasons claims that right-kind reasons are facts that contribute to the constitutive correctness of the responses they purportedly favour; hence, since constitutive correctness lacks authoritative normativity, so too do right-kind reasons. And according to a recent argument from Barry Maguire (2018), right-kind reasons for attitudes aren’t reasons at all and hence a fortiori aren’t authoritative reasons. This chapter argues that these recent arguments against the authoritative normativity of right-kind reasons fail. It also argues that the intuitive data suggests that right-kind reasons are authoritative. Thus, the authoritative normativity of right-kind reasons is defended. Since right-kind reasons are facts that contribute to an attitude’s fittingness, the chapter’s defence doubles as a defence of the authoritative normativity of fit.