The Economy and Executive Approval in a Semi-Presidential Regime

Abstract

Abstract In semi-presidential systems, the public approval of both prime ministers and elected presidents can be, like elsewhere, affected by economic performance. However, the Portuguese case illustrates the persistence of a few blind spots in the study of popularity functions under semi-presidentialism. These concern how changing economic and institutional contexts produce an unstable relationship between economic performance and approval. Using simultaneous equation models of the popularity of both prime ministers and presidents, the authors examine two yet unexplored routes of inquiry in the Portuguese case. The first is the possibility that economic effects may be asymmetric, with bad times exerting stronger effects on approval than good times. The second concerns the way such effects are suppressed in periods of cohabitation between prime ministers and presidents from a different party serving their second (and last) term. The combination between cohabitation and lack of re-election incentives for presidents contributes to obscure accountability for economic performance, making it a less relevant driver of public approval of both entities.