The Cost of Ruling above Everything Else

Abstract

Abstract This chapter examines the drivers of presidential popularity in the context of the French Fifth Republic. French presidents over time have strikingly similar experiences in terms of popularity: a peak after the election soon followed by a process of erosion. This ‘cost-of-ruling’ pattern is particularly strong in the Fifth Republic, facilitated by the concentration of power in the hands of presidents, making them the person to blame. Cost of ruling tends to dominate other possible drivers of popularity and hinders the president’s capacity to benefit from good economic conditions. This changes only during cohabitations, when presidents and prime ministers are of different parties or coalitions: power-sharing makes the president more popular and better able to gain from good economic performance. The authors’ analyses also reveal that this cost of ruling has increased over time: in the early years of the Fifth Republic presidents enjoyed consistently higher levels of popularity, but this is no longer the case.