Conclusion

Abstract

Abstract This brief conclusion reiterates the two main philosophical assumptions this book has attempted to call into question, namely, that (i) morally meaningful experience is exhaustively discursive in form and (ii) if objective moral grounds exist, those grounds must be immutable. It reiterates that the first half of the book (Chapters 1–3) was focused on challenging the first assumption by developing a notion of proto-discursive moral experience, while the second half of the book (Chapters 4–6) was focused on challenging the second assumption by defending a variation of Aristotelian ethics that is sensitive to historical changes in our nature. It concludes with a broader lesson that the exploration of moral articulation seeks to impart, namely, that when doing moral philosophy we should not treat descriptions of moral situations and dilemmas as sheer givens, but see them as complex products of a process of articulation that is an ethical task in its own right.