Abstract
Abstract
This chapter asks whether moral facts are discursively constructed, posing this in relation to discussions in recent critical social theory, exemplified by Ian Hacking and Sally Haslanger, concerning the “feedback loops” that sustain unjust ideologies. These discussions sometimes run into a dilemma: moral facts are either discursively constructed, meaning that we must embrace an uncritical relativism that makes ideology critique impossible, or they are not discursively constructed, meaning that we must embrace the existence of at least some ahistorically existing moral facts. This chapter argues that the dilemma can be avoided by distinguishing between causal and rational forms of discursive construction. In its latter form, discursive construction is both epistemically and developmentally oriented. When successful, its objects undergo not just any change, but maturation and moral growth. The chapter develops this through an analogy between a case from E.M. Forster’s novel, Maurice, and larger-scale social movement-driven cases of moral articulation.
Publisher
Oxford University PressNew York
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