Moral and Pragmatic Encroachment

Abstract

Abstract This chapter examines pragmatic encroachment and moral encroachment in epistemology. According to these views, epistemic norms are sensitive to the moral and practical stakes and costs of believing. In particular, pragmatic encroachment theorists typically argue that when the practical stakes of a question are high, one should require higher-than-usual evidential support in order for belief to be appropriate. And moral encroachment theorists argue that when certain moral or political considerations are implicated, one should also be slower to believe, lest one commit a “doxastic wrong.” Both thoughts contribute to the negative bias in epistemology, assuming that suspension of judgment is safe, and belief is dangerous. This chapter critically examines that assumption, and develops a case for versions of moral and pragmatic encroachment whereby, in certain cases, due to the importance of a question, one should be quicker to believe, rather than slower.