A Theory of Presidential Government Formation in New Democracies

Abstract

Abstract This chapter presents a theory of presidential cabinet formation in new democracies, focusing on the chief executive’s pressures and dilemmas in dealing with key political institutions surrounding the president, namely the legislature, the ruling party, the party system, and the bureaucracy. When presidents are more constrained by these institutions, they are more likely to accommodate the latter’s interests by appointing candidates representing them to cabinet. However, when presidents have stronger command over these institutions, they have greater discretion in choosing top executive appointees from outside the institutions. Building on this argument, this chapter extends the discussion of the president’s appointment strategy when facing various conditions shaping the president’s strength vis-à-vis each of the four institutions, and then sets out the observable implications for the theory. The chapter also discusses the possible interaction between different institutions and provides predictions of how such interaction may constrain the president’s cabinet choices.