Bureaucratic Resistance and Presidential Cabinet Formation

Abstract

Abstract This chapter tests the argument related to presidents’ efforts to monitor and control the bureaucracy in implementing their reform programs. The main prediction is that, facing challenges from professionalized bureaucracies, presidents tend to appoint ministers from the bureaucracy who can tame the agents, but with greater influence over politicized bureaucracies, presidents are more likely to select ministers from outside the bureaucracy who are experts in their fields. The results based on quantitative analysis show that presidents are more likely to appoint ministers representing the bureaucracy in more professionalized bureaucracies but are less likely to do so in more politicized bureaucracies. Furthermore, qualitative evidence based on interviews and case studies reveals that, in more professionalized systems, presidents tend to promote into top executive positions senior civil servants who are ideologically aligned with them; however, in more politicized systems, presidents tend to choose experts from outside the bureaucracy when forming cabinets.