A Note on Freedom and Flexibility

Abstract

Abstract Amartya Sen has emphasized many times the limitations of the welfarist viewpoint in evaluating social alternatives. It has even reached the point that the lesson has begun to sink in. The propositions of classical welfare economics or, for that matter, of social choice theory have been naturally interpreted in purely welfare terms. But there are many dimensions not easily put into the welfarist framework. One of these is the notion of freedom of choice. As Sen notes, ‘In examining the well-being aspect of a person, attention can legitimately be paid to the capability set of the person and not just to the chosen functioning vector’ (Sen 1985, p. 201). (The capability set had been defined ‘as the set of functioning vectors within [a person’s] reach’.) He contrasts two individuals who are starving, one out of necessity, one out of choice. The Dewey lectures just cited and Sen’s Marshall Lecture (Sen 1988) discuss richly the possible meanings of freedom and the spaces of alternatives over which it is defined. However, my aim in this note is to discuss the formal characteristics of a definition of freedom, rather than its interpretation.