Abstract
Abstract
This chapter applies the ideal of resisting state capture to the first major task of democratic theory, as outlined in Chapter 1: namely, evaluating the existing practices of electoral democracy. It begins by insisting that recent “epistemic” challenges to democracy must be taken seriously, and that existing responses to these challenges are underwhelming. It then develops a novel instrumental account of why basic electoral democracy is valuable, providing a more robust and broadly compelling rebuttal to its critics. It proceeds by comparing competitive elections and universal suffrage with their most plausible concrete alternatives: a political meritocracy where political leaders select their own replacements, and an epistocracy restricting the franchise to those with certain epistemic or moral virtues. It demonstrates that these alternatives would enable incumbents to entrench their power far more easily, and would thus dramatically increase the danger of the most severe and pervasive forms of tyrannical state capture. And this explains—in robust yet realistic terms—why electoral democracy, despite its many flaws, cannot be abandoned under any circumstances. After this defensive account of democracy’s value, the chapter then develops a brief positive account of how elections keep public officials loosely tethered to the public interest, despite the very real and concerning shortcomings of responsive representation highlighted in Chapter 2. Finally, it emphasizes that the appropriate attitude towards electoral democracy is one of “measured appreciation,” and highlights the implications of adopting this attitude for other normative and philosophical domains, such as legal theories of administrative legitimacy.
Publisher
Oxford University PressOxford
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