Paternalism

Abstract

AbstractThis chapter defends the perfectionist conception of justice against Jonathan Quong’s argument that perfectionist political action is paternalistic because it is premised on the belief that, when left to their own devices, citizens will fail to make sound choices about how to use their time and resources. In response, the author concedes that perfectionist political action does involve the assumption that citizens are not always disposed to make rational decisions about their own good, but denies that there is anything disrespectful about proceeding on the basis of such an assumption—especially given that, as mounting evidence from the fields of social psychology and behavioural economics suggests, this assumption is true of all human beings. To defend this position, the author develops an alternative conception of what respect for the moral status of citizens requires—a conception that requires that the state treat citizens as if they are disposed often, but not always, to make rational decisions about their own good, and thus that is compatible with some degree of paternalism.