Abstract
AbstractThis chapter specifies and defends the conception of human flourishing that is to be incorporated into the perfectionist principles of justice. The author rejects several prominent conceptions of human flourishing that have been defended by previous perfectionists (namely, Christian, Confucian and Aristotelian conceptions) on the grounds that they are subject to reasonable disagreement and so are not legitimate sources of political reasons under conditions of reasonable pluralism, even if true. Instead, the author defends a more free-standing conception that holds that, at least for political purposes, human flourishing consists in the enjoyment of moral, intellectual and artistic excellence. It is stressed that this is a provisional free-standing conception of human flourishing: it is a reasonable approximation, but it is open to refinement and revision as a result of a broader process of philosophical inquiry into the nature of human flourishing. This conception is then defended against two objections: that the selection of moral, intellectual and artistic excellence is arbitrary, since no mention is made of the deeper feature that explains why all and only these excellences contribute to human flourishing; and that enjoyment and excellence are not strictly necessary conditions of human flourishing because excellence devoid of enjoyment and enjoyment devoid of excellence can both contribute to human flourishing.
Publisher
Oxford University PressOxford
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