Freedom

Abstract

AbstractThis chapter defends the perfectionist conception of justice against the objection that perfectionist laws and policies are unduly restrictive of freedom or autonomy. The author contends that, on the one hand, perfectionist justice is compatible with many of the conceptions of freedom found within contemporary political philosophy and that, on the other hand, the conceptions of freedom with which perfectionist justice is incompatible (such as libertarian conceptions of freedom as full self-ownership) are not in any case independently plausible. This chapter also address a more pragmatic variant of the freedom-based objection: namely that, however hospitable to freedom perfectionism is in theory, any attempt to implement perfectionism in practice would risk the abuse of political power and the violation of individual liberties by incompetent or corrupt state officials, and so common sense dictates taking ideals of human flourishing off the political agenda as a kind of prophylactic measure.