Trivial Pursuit? Extremes, Resolution, and the Search for Happiness in Gracián’s El Criticón

Abstract

Abstract Chapter 5 studies the presentation of the mean in Gracián’s Criticón, the most sophisticated and sustained engagement with the doctrine in Golden-Age literature. It argues that Gracián is not simply advocating Aristotle’s mean, but that scrutiny of the mean allows the Criticón’s long-controversial ethical teaching to be clearly set out, and that the Criticón’s governing allegory should be read as Gracián’s answer to the old Christian–Aristotelian controversy over the role of earthly felicitas. The chapter begins by discussing the Criticón’s generic and intellectual affiliations, alongside the implications of its title, to illustrate the kind of ethical system we should expect, and why its specifics have proved hard to codify. The chapter then examines the Criticón’s presentation of the mean, beginning with summary references to its lexis and logic, which offer invaluable guidance for Gracián’s approach. The bulk of the chapter then offers detailed analysis of the Criticón, setting out the process for moral decision-making which represents its central teaching. This focuses on major set-piece scenes where Critilo and Andrenio must follow the logic of the mean at crossroads of two or three paths; the extension of the logic of the mean into matters of perception; and the interaction of these issues with other ethical questions introduced throughout the work. The analysis shows how Gracián’s system for ethical decision-making is built up carefully but in piecemeal fashion, and only successfully enacted in the Criticón’s final chapters, where the location of Felisinda represents Gracián’s contribution to debates surrounding Aristotelian virtue and eudaimonia.