This chapter briefly defends each of the following theses, which together comprise an interest-based model of moral status: (1) Being human is neither necessary nor sufficient for moral status; (2) The capacity for consciousness is necessary but not sufficient; (3) Sentience is necessary and sufficient; (4) Social relations are not a basis for moral status but may ground special obligations to those with moral status; (5) The concept of personhood is unhelpful in modeling moral status, unless a non-vague conception is identified and its moral relevance clarified; (6) Sentient beings are entitled to equal consequentialist consideration; and (7) Sentient beings with substantial temporal self-awareness have special interests that justify the added protection of rights. This model will be engaged in illuminating the moral status of ordinary, self-aware human beings, non-paradigm humans, animals, robots and AI systems, brain organoids, and post-humans with superior self-awareness.