Author:
Bak Ane Karoline,Kjær Anne Mette,Ulriksen Marianne S.
Abstract
Abstract
In this concluding chapter, we summarize the comparative findings from across the ten empirical chapters in this edited volume. We present key findings on the three most common triggers of revenue bargaining; on how and where processes of bargaining unfold, focusing on the influence of relative-bargaining positions of revenue providers and ruling elites at the outset and how it evolves; and on the outcomes, specifically whether revenue bargaining leads to fiscal contracts and what such contracts look like. We end the chapter by highlighting two broader macro-level implications of our findings: first, politics matters in revenue mobilization whereby those within or close to the ruling elite can negotiate better outcomes than those who are less favourably placed. Second, we see signs of state–society reciprocity, which opens the political space and holds promises for more inclusive and formalized settings for policymaking and, hence, the potential for a society-wide fiscal social contract.
Publisher
Oxford University PressOxford
Reference18 articles.
1. Democratisation in Tanzania: No Elections without Tax Exemptions;Journal of Eastern African Studies,2022
2. 304Bräutigam, D. 2008. ‘Introduction: Taxation and State-building in Developing Countries’. In Taxation and State-Building in Developing Countries, edited by D. Bräutigam, O.-H. Fjeldstad, and M. Moore, pp. 1–33. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
3. Thinking about Hybrid Regimes;Journal of Democracy,2002
4. The Three Pillars of Stability: Legitimation, Repression, and Co-optation in Autocratic Regimes;Democratization,2013