Brokered fiscal contracts

Abstract

Abstract This chapter traces three decades of revenue bargaining in Senegal’s informal commercial sector. It focuses on brokers’ influence on processes and specifically outcomes of revenue bargaining around: the attempts to generalize value-added taxation (VAT) in the 1990s; the reforms of the informal sector tax contribution globale unique in the 2000s and 2010s; and lastly, advance payments on imports. The chapter provides a nuanced description of power relations inside Senegal’s commercial sector and argues that what essentially become brokered fiscal contracts can be explained by shifts in the relative bargaining positions of the ruling elites vis-à-vis the informal commercial sector and their brokers, in particular Union Nationale des Commercants et Industriels du Sénégal (UNACOIS). The chapter demonstrates the instrumental value of a long-term historical approach and the importance of recognizing the distinct role of brokers when studying revenue bargaining in clientelist political settlements, in Senegal and beyond.