Abstract
Abstract
This chapter explains why, for Aristotle, some forms of clear-eyed akrasia are possible. For Aristotle, grasping the truth about appearances of goodness, fineness and pleasantness is insufficient to regulate action. This explains why, for Aristotle, we are often conflicted and that we can be clear-eyed when we act against our best judgements.
Publisher
Oxford University PressOxford
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