Abstract
Abstract
Phronēsis is a peculiar practical excellence in that it must be authoritative and persuasive and control both desires and actions. In order to be persuasive, phronēsis needs to go beyond grasping the truth about the human good. It must be effective in directing attention and it must produce explanations suitable for the persuasion of the non-rational part of the soul. Furthermore, the persuasive function of phronēsis is hindered if the non-rational part is not virtuous, i.e. if it is not an excellent listener. This explains why, for Aristotle, phronēsis and character virtue are distinct but interdependent.
Publisher
Oxford University PressOxford
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