Abstract
Abstract
This chapter shows that the ignorance of the akratic is in fact a lack of phronēsis, and therefore a failure of persuasion. The akratic, like the enkratic, does not fully grasp the reasons or the values that ground her decision to act well and therefore fails to bring in line her non-rational desires. Hence, the ignorance of the akratic is compatible with at least some form of clear-eyed akrasia.
Publisher
Oxford University PressOxford
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