Indicatives Versus Imperatives

Abstract

Abstract This chapter has two main goals. One is to defend the value-representing theory of valence outlined in Chapter 5, comparing it with accounts that construe valence, not as indicative (representing—correctly or incorrectly—properties of the world), but rather as a kind of imperative. While developed initially to provide theories of the painfulness of pain, imperative accounts have now been extended into theories of pleasure and displeasure more generally. It is these generalized accounts that are considered here. The second main goal of the chapter is to articulate and then critique forms of imperativism about valence that entail motivational hedonism (in fact, only experience-directed kinds of imperativism do). The upshots of the chapter are twofold: the value-representing account provides the best overall theory of valence, and pluralism rather than hedonism provides the best account of human (and animal) motivation, thus making room for altruism.