Stance-Independence

Abstract

Abstract Having rejected the most promising stance-dependence theories in the previous two chapters, this chapter considers the prospects of a stance-independent moral ontology—that is, the ontology of moral realism. It shows that a realist view is well-placed to capture the non-arbitrariness of moral choice. It first explains how the commitment to stance-independent moral facts allows realists to avoid the arbitrariness charges that challenge stance-dependence theories. It then asks whether realists can handle the arbitrariness charges facing their own view—namely, the ownership charge and a version of the bruteness charge. It shows that answering the latter requires a commitment to categorical and (thus) irreducibly normative, non-natural reasons. This is a controversial commitment, so this chapter ends with a partial vindication of it. Specifically, it offers a ‘companions in innocence’ argument involving the normativity of non-moral needs.