Truth and Epistemic Standards

Abstract

Abstract This chapter addresses one way truth might be an “epistemic good”. An epistemic good is something that is valuable from the purely epistemic perspective, which sets aside all practical, moral, and other non-intellectual concerns. It can appear that truth matters even from that limited perspective. But why? The chapter focuses on the idea that truth’s value helps to explain or rationalize our epistemic standards, which we deploy in deciding what to believe or assessing the justification of beliefs. If that idea is correct, then we can call truth a “regulative epistemic good”. One way for truth to be a regulative epistemic good is given by the regulative epistemic value-conferral model. On that model, the truth of a proposition confers special value on states of believing it, and our epistemic standards are responses to our recognition of that value. Such an account of truth as a regulative epistemic good would conflict with the Strong Virtue Theory. After outlining the regulative epistemic value-conferral model, the chapter discusses a debate between Paul Horwich and Gurpreet Rattan. Horwich denies that truth is a regulative epistemic good, while Rattan contends that it is. But neither offers a compelling argument. The chapter then draws on insights from both Horwich and Rattan to construct an alternative account of truth as a regulative epistemic good, without resort to the regulative epistemic value-conferral model.