Truth and Instrumental Value

Abstract

Abstract This chapter begins a retail case against the idea that truth confers value on beliefs. It addresses the case of instrumental value. Does the truth of a proposition confer instrumental value on states of believing it? Instrumentally valuable beliefs help us to achieve our goals. The chapter argues that truth as such doesn’t make a belief helpful in achieving our goals. In stereotypical cases, we credit our successes to true belief and our failures to false belief. That, however, has more to do with our stereotypes than with truth itself. The chapter criticizes two arguments for the claim that truth confers instrumental value on beliefs. They are the “argument from means-end beliefs” and the “dangerous falsehoods argument”. The latter is unable to establish the instrumental value of true beliefs, in general, as such. Both fail to appreciate the holistic way in which our beliefs, true and false, guide our actions in the world. Whether a belief helps us get what we want depends largely on what else we believe in the context of our action. Sometimes a true belief would help us, and sometimes we need a false one. The chapter also considers the sense in which we really should value true beliefs as means to our ends. Properly understood, it does not require resources beyond the what the Strong Virtue Theory provides.