Truth and Intrinsic Value

Abstract

Abstract This chapter addresses the idea that a claim’s truth makes states of believing it good in an intrinsic, underived way. They are good simply in virtue of the fact that they are states of believing something true. It is argued that truth does not confer intrinsic value on beliefs. Still, there is a sense in which we ought to value truth “intrinsically”, and it is entirely compatible with the Strong Virtue Theory. After clarifying the relevant notion of intrinsic value, the chapter makes the case against truth’s being an intrinsic good. The case has two parts. First, it is argued that no amount of true belief is intrinsically better than any amount of any other intrinsic good. Second, it is argued that the best explanation for that fact is that truth confers no intrinsic value on beliefs. The chapter concludes with by showing that truth need not be an intrinsic good to be something we should care about for its own sake.