Truth as the Goal of Inquiry

Abstract

Abstract This chapter addresses a second way in which truth can seem to be an epistemic good. Perhaps truth is an epistemic good because it is the defining goal of inquiry. Then a proposition’s truth might make states of believing it into realizations of the goal of inquiry, thus conferring a kind of epistemic goodness on them. The chapter argues against the idea that truth is a defining goal of inquiry. Inquiry does not necessarily aim for truth, but for epistemic improvement. The basic line of argument is that truth can’t be the goal of inquiry if it is possible to inquire sincerely when one knows one already has the true answer to a question. Such “knowing inquiry”, however, is possible. So, truth isn’t the goal of inquiry. Instead, the chapter suggests that inquiry aims at improving one’s epistemic situation, generally by improving the accuracy of one’s degrees of belief in possible answers. Such an approach makes sense of how inquiry often does aim for truth, and it allows for an innocent version of the claim that inquiry “aims for truth”, consistent with the Strong Virtue Theory.