Abstract
Abstract
There are many parts of our lives for which it seems perfectly right and proper that we differ from each other in our relation to value: we pursue different careers, choose different spouses, prefer different flavors of ice cream. Even the most robust of realists typically assumes that where this is so—where the value on the scene is properly ‘idiosyncratic’, as I put it—we cannot understand this value on a realist model, and must instead see it as deriving from the person’s attitudes or preferences. I argue that this assumption is mistaken, and that the phenomenon of idiosyncrasy is fully compatible with realism. The world contains many different forms of value, and we each possess different forms of ‘value-expertise’—different kinds and degrees of ability to experience, understand, and engage with that value. This model allows us to make sense of idiosyncrasy within a fully realist framework.
Publisher
Oxford University PressOxford