Extending Modal Platonism

Abstract

AbstractThis chapter locates the Platonic theory of natural modality within the broader project of explaining all modal facts in terms of second-order relationships between properties. Drawing on the work of Michael Jubien, it is argued that a property-driven approach to possibility and necessity is preferable to the previously dominant ‘possible-worlds’ theories. The chapter then explores some of the second-order relations that are needed if Modal Platonism is to be regarded as a comprehensive theory of modality. It is argued that if properties are to do the work that possible worlds can do, then a commitment to Platonism is inevitable, since it provides resources for accounting for unrealized possibilities. The discussion focuses on possibilities involving ‘alien’ properties, which play an important role in scientific theory. The chapter concludes by raising further questions that will need to be addressed if Modal Platonism is to provide a complete account of modality.