Abstract
Abstract
This chapter’s analysis is devoted to one of the book’s central inquiries, namely how competition law should adapt to better integrate the value of data protection into its analysis. Starting with the notion of ‘data power’, it first explores how the economic strength of technology companies should be better reflected in competition law assessments of market power. It then turns to the area of abuse of a dominant position to discuss a set of exploitative and exclusionary theories of harm that could better capture new data protection harms in digital markets. This is complemented with an overview of the role of data protection in antitrust justifications and remedies. Next to the area of abuse of dominance, merger control constitutes another major focal point of this chapter. It explores how merger theories of harm, potential justifications, and remedies should be rethought to better respond to the demands of sectional coherence.
Publisher
Oxford University PressOxford
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