Near the end of his Enquiry concerning Human Understanding David Hume declared that the ‘best and most solid foundation’ of divinity and theology was ‘faith and divine revelation’. Many other passages can be found where Hume uses similar fideist arguments to criticize the application of philosophical reason to religious questions. The question addressed in this chapter is how Hume’s criticism of the use of philosophy in religious and theological argument compares to the beliefs of his contemporaries on the same subject. In particular, it examines his intellectual relationship with the two main groups within the mid-eighteenth-century Presbyterian Kirk, the ‘Orthodox’ and the ‘Moderates’. Claiming that the fideist language used by Hume was not as similar to the position of orthodox Presbyterians as has sometimes been suggested, the chapter also argues that Hume’s sceptical, fideist arguments about philosophy and religion were closer to the beliefs of these Moderates, including Hutcheson, Leechman, Robertson, and Blair, than has often been realized. Nevertheless, they and Hume differed significantly in their explanations for the emergence of religious belief in human societies.