Forgiving

Abstract

AbstractMany philosophers analyzing standing to blame have argued that (a) a blamer can lack standing to blame someone even if what that person did is blameworthy; (b) standingless hypocritical blame is pro tanto morally wrongful; (c) factors other than hypocrisy can undermine standing to blame. Philosophers have yet to address the issue of standing to forgive. This chapter defends two main claims. First, the conditional claim that if (a)–(c) are true, then so are (a*)–(c*). The latter are (a*) a forgiver can lack standing to forgive someone else for an act even if there are reasons why this act is forgivable; (b*) standingless hypocritical forgiveness is pro tanto morally wrongful; (c*) factors other than hypocrisy can annul someone’s standing to forgive. Facts about standing to forgive reflect more general facts about the discretionary exercise of normative powers to change one’s conversational rights to blame and praise. In the course of defending this claim, the chapter introduces the notion of “fromtaking.” This term refers to the discretionary exercise of one’s normative powers to change whether one has the liberty right to praise a particular agent for a particular praiseworthy action (the negative equivalent of forgiving). The second claim for which the chapter argues is the claim that (a*)–(c*) are true.