Abstract
AbstractPhilosophers analyzing standing to blame have argued that (a) a blamer can lack the standing to blame an agent for an act even if the act is blameworthy; (b) standingless hypocritical blame is pro tanto morally wrongful; (c) several factors other than hypocrisy can undermine standing to blame. However, very little attention has been given to the issue of standing to praise. This chapter defends two main claims. First is the claim that if (a)–(c) are true, then so are (a*)–(c*). The latter are (a*) a praiser can lack the standing to praise someone else for an act even if that act is praiseworthy; (b*) standingless hypocritical praise is pro tanto morally wrongful; (c*) several factors other than hypocrisy can undermine someone’s standing to praise. Facts about standing to blame reflect more general facts about standing to hold responsible. Second is the claim that (a*)–(c*) are true.
Publisher
Oxford University PressNew York
Reference203 articles.
1. Forgiveness: A Christian Model.;Faith and Philosophy,1991
2. Aikin, Scott F. and Talisse, Robert. 2008. “The Truth about Hypocrisy.” Scientific American, 1 December. https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-truth-about-hypocrisy/.
3. Wiping the Slate Clean: The Heart of Forgiveness.;Philosophy & Public Affairs,2008
4. Freedom and Forgiveness.;Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility,2014