Abstract
Abstract
Sterba first briefly restates his argument that the God of traditional theism is logically incompatible with all the evil in the world. He responds to Swinburne’s objections to that argument, including the two counterexamples that Swinburne raises to the premises of that argument. Sterba then turns to a consideration of Swinburne’s own argument in defence of the God of traditional theism and shows that given Swinburne’s own normative premises, the God of traditional theism is logically incompatible with all the evil in the world. Finally, Sterba claims that it was only because he was working in moral and political philosophy that he was able to come up with exceptionless, minimal components of the Pauline Principle that are necessary requirements of morality and utilize categories from political philosophy to consider all the goods with which God could provide us in order to construct the Mackie-style argument that he defends in this book.
Publisher
Oxford University PressOxford
Reference14 articles.
1. Michael Bergmann, ‘Skeptical Theism and the Problem of Evil’, in T. P. Flint and M. Rea (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Theology (Oxford University Press, 2009), Chapter 17.
2. S. J. Wykstra, ‘Rowe’s Noseeum Arguments from Evil’, in D. Howard-Snyder (ed.), The Evidential Argument from Evil (Indiana University Press, 1996), Chapter 7.