Awareness and the Normativity of Knowledge

Abstract

Abstract Many have found it plausible that knowledge is a state grounded in the possession of reasons. Many have also found it plausible that certain cases of knowledge are not grounded in the possession of reasons in cases of basic knowledge. Such cases form the primary objection to the idea that knowledge is a constitutively normative state. In what follows the dilemma of having to choose between basic knowledge and the normativity of knowledge is resolved by relying on the idea that the possession of reasons is to be understood in terms of factual awareness. After explaining the idea that knowledge is a constitutively normative state and providing motivations for this view, this chapter explores the integrity of objections to the normativity of knowledge. It then shows how broad factualism and the awareness-theoretic account of possession converge in a way that helps us understand the constitutive normativity of knowledge.