The book describes the long and difficult process that led to the central banking model prevailing in most advanced economies at the end of last century. The critical institutional basis of that model is an independent central bank with price stability as its dominant objective. The book, which looks in particular at the Federal Reserve of the United States (Fed) and at the European Central Bank (ECB), also presents the essential components of that model, while noting that financial stability did not fit well in it and was the neglected child of central banks before the Great Recession. The book then illustrates the hits that the Great Recession delivered to that model and asks whether a radical rethinking of the model is necessary. In particular, it examines whether the renewed importance of the financial stability objective, the blurred borders between fiscal and monetary policies, the moral hazard created by the central bank’s forceful actions, and, finally, the actions of the ECB to protect the euro have jeopardized the pre-crisis central bank model. The answer to this question is that, while it is not possible to simply return to the pre-crisis central bank model, the adaptations that are needed are more incremental than radical when considered in a long historical perspective. They nevertheless require changes in the statutes of both the Fed and the ECB, and thus will have to overcome a high institutional hurdle.