The ‘Two Worlds Theory’ in the Philebus

Abstract

Abstract This paper asks whether Plato endorses the ‘Two Worlds Theory’ in the Philebus. The issue is complicated in part because that theory has been formulated in different, not obviously equivalent ways. Accordingly, the paper begins by distinguishing different versions of the view. It then explores the central passages in the Philebus, asking whether they endorse one or another version of the view. One issue discussed is how we should understand epistēmē in the dialogue: is it restricted to everlasting, unchanging things? Is all epistēmē knowledge, and, if so, how should we understand ‘knowledge’ here? Is all epistēmē true, or is some epistēmē false? Plato distinguishes different levels of epistēmē, but how many of them are there and how are they to be distinguished?